Political Clientelism in the Allocation of State Budget Resources to Local Public Authorities
Automatically translated summary. The full text is available in Romanian.
A study analyses how state budget resources were allocated to local public authorities in Moldova between 2009 and 2017, through four transfer instruments. It compares lists of approved projects with the political affiliation of mayors and district presidents in order to identify signs of political clientelism in the distribution of funds.
The analysis found that mayors affiliated with the ruling party or coalition were more likely to receive funding than opposition or independent mayors. During periods of heavy political migration (2010-2011 and 2016-2017), the differences narrowed to at most 10 percentage points. Parliamentary election years (2009, 2010, 2014) saw larger total sums and higher average project values, for example MDL 685.9 thousand per project in 2009. Clientelism peaked in 2012, when a ruling-alliance mayor was on average six times more likely to receive funds than an opposition mayor. The Energy Efficiency Fund appeared least affected, with index values of up to 2, though it became more politicised from 2016.
The study recommends clear allocation criteria, terms of reference for fund projects, needs assessments regardless of political colour including cost-benefit analysis, local citizens' committees to monitor procurement and works, and action by the competent bodies on fraud reported by the media and civil society.
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